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Social Class and Social Work in the Age of Trump

Introduction
Social work, and social workers, must play a critical role in addressing
dangerous rhetoric, policies, and practices in the United States associated with
social class and its intersections Social class has many meanings and
components– economic, social, political, one’s sense of identity, and how class
intersects with other social identities – so it is difficult to define it briefly and
succinctly. These definitions are further complicated by a global lens, where
family of origin, geography, and other factors can pre-determine social class.
In this article we explore the complexities and contradictions of social class in
the context of the United States as we believe that this is important for social
work, particularly in the age of Donald Trump, where class, and its intersection
with race and immigration status, is often used as a weapon to divide society
and seek political advantages. While such use of class categories is not new in
this country or in political rhetoric globally, the current climate in the United
States warrants a review. Class, like so many areas of identity and oppression,
can only be understood from vantage points that also account for what is
meant by class, who gets to tell the story of what class means, and how the
notion of class is manipulated and appropriated by a range of people.
In this article we will explore a range of ways of understanding the
meaning of social class and ultimately how such understandings can inform
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social work practice. We will begin by reviewing classical definitions of class,
including a consideration of poverty, social inequality, power, privilege,
resource hoarding, social and political capital and integrate subjective,
individual and group aspects of class. We will then consider class through an
intersectional lens: considering how the social construction of social class
intersects with other aspects of social identity, notably race, gender, and
immigration status. Our discussion includes contemporary narratives about
social class and current trends in meaning making about social class. Finally,
we will discuss the significance of social class, and its intersections, in social
work practice. Discerning how the notion of social class is understood in a
particularly socio-political moment sheds light on how policy interventions are
leveraged, or not leveraged, to address inequality. These insights, may help to
explain why so many white voters supported and continue to support Donald
Trump and who, exactly, Trump’s policy initiatives will serve. What does all of
this imply for social work education, micro and macro practice and research?
A Review of the Definitions of Social Class
Classical sociology, particularly stemming from the thinking of Marx and
Weber, views social class as having three dimensions: economic, social and
political (Encyclopedia of Sociology, 1974). Economically, it refers to how
people are stratified by income, assets, and the resources that they can accrue
and control. Socially, Weber talked about status groups, where there are
different levels of prestige and there are shared life-styles, values, behaviors
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and rituals. Politically, people view themselves as parts of groups, often
forming organizations that advocate for and represent class interests – e.g.
labor unions, Chambers of Commerce, political parties.
Virtually every society has groups that are separated and divided from
one another by virtue of a hierarchal social matrix. People in higher social
classes have greater access to resources, such as wealth, power, property
social capital and prestige; the combination of such factors constituting “socioeconomic status”. Part of this equation is the notion of “social mobility,” being
able to move up in social class, with some societies having rigid class
boundaries that are seldom breached, while others have ladders and
socioeconomic enablers that make it possible for people to move up in class,
which also means that there are socio-economic trap-doors, where people fall
from a higher to a lower class. These can be due to recessions or depressions,
but also because of war, genocide, ethnic conflict, and the collapse of
institutions that maintain structural class hierarchies. For example, many
Jews living in Europe during the 1930’s and 1940’s experienced downward
mobility from a combination of the above factors. There are usually benefits for
people who are members of higher socio-economic classes: better health, longer
life expectancy, and a greater sense of life satisfaction. Perhaps most
importantly, class mobility is less a function of individual effort or
characteristics and very much a function of government policies that promote
or undermine it.
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Marx explicitly wrote about how power and exploitation are important
aspects of social and economic class (Encyclopedia of Sociology, 1974). He also
introduced the concept of “class conflict,” which helps to explain how power is
exercised by different class groups, particularly how owners and economic
elites exploit workers. The shrinking membership in trade unions, (which has
been abetted by deindustrialization and by laws and social policies, as well as
globalization) and consequent loss of political power, has weakened the ability
of workers people to protect themselves from the economic fray of the
marketplace.
So, over time class was understood as pertaining to economic, social and
political resources and power. Given this, the impact of social class on the life
course and quality of life is profound. It influences how and what people eat,
where they live, educational attainment, economic opportunities, access to
clean water, and health and safety (Ryan, Singh, Hentschke, & Bullock, 2018).
But as Ryan et al. point out, economic uncertainty and scarcity (whether real
or perceived) also affects how people think and feel about themselves, their
relationships, and the context in which they live.
In 1972, Sennett and Cobb published a seminal book, The hidden
injuries of class, which complicated the classical meaning of social class
(Sennett & Cobb, 1973). Based on qualitative interviews with working class,
white, Italian American men in Boston, they argued that class is also an
internal part of a person’s identity; how we see ourselves and others. They
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coined terms such as “badges of ability,” “sacrifice and betrayal,” and “injured
dignity” to capture the themes articulated by their research participants, which
centered on how their values, emotions, and internalized conflicts were
associated with class. When some men became educated and moved into
professional and middle-class contexts, they often felt as if they did not belong,
that they were “passing.” But even though many experienced a sense of class
loyalty and a wish to maintain fidelity to their families and neighborhoods, they
also felt uprooted, dislocated, and alienated from their own class backgrounds,
expressing a sense of liminality and ambivalence. Despite increases in material
well-being, there was a diminishing sense of self-respect; feelings of
embarrassment and shame about not really being middle class alongside
disdain for that class (Benn, 2001). As Benn points out, when one’s social class
was inherited and there was little social mobility, there was therefore little that
one could do about one’s position in life. But with the demise of hereditary
social distinctions, one’s social station is often taken personally, viewed as a
matter of personal failing or weak character.
There are important critiques of this study – it did not question or
interrogate that its data and conclusions came from a limited sample of white,
heterosexual men. But it added an important subjective dimension to our
understanding of social class; that it is part of a person’s identity. We will
consider the significance of this, along with racial and gender identity, in the
age of Trump.
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Thus, social class has external, hard components (e.g. income, assets,
wealth, economic mobility), group-lifestyle aspects (e.g. behaviors, affiliations,
values) and an internalized sense of self (e.g. identity, emotions, aspirations).
And all aspects of social class involve status – it is always in relation to and in
comparison, with others; the notion of social class loses its meaning without
economic and perceived social differences between groups. This means that it
is both how one sees oneself and how one sees and is seen by others. And
social class involves power: the power to meet basic needs, to spend and
acquire, to live in certain neighborhoods, to attend specific schools, to have
high credit ratings, to leave assets for descendants, to produce and disseminate
dominant public narratives, to engage in and influence the political process, as
well as an internalized sense of power, efficacy and entitlement. Social class
may also have an impact on the embodied experience of individuals, including
their exposure to work related health and mental health hazards that
negatively impact a person’s life.
Singha (2017) argues that to view class solely as an objective,
quantitative category, while making it easier for researchers and other external
observers, misses the subjective meanings of class. But he also argues that to
only focus on the subjectivity of class is a limited view and leads to categorical
fuzziness. He notes that the cut-off points that demarcate class can seem
arbitrary. His point raises the question of who has the power and authority to
determine such boundaries? Singha also notes that social class involves social
networks and is part of a specific sociocultural context featuring public
6

discourses that define, describe and shape social class. An example of
sociocultural differences constructing class is how in England, social class is
not only tied to money and economic resources but to breeding, land, and
titles, which is not true in the US, where it is tethered more to one’s economic
wealth and resources. Thus, social class is not solely about economics.
Given the complexity of the meaning of social class, it can be helpful to
make a distinction between class positions, which are based on statistics,
economic location, wages, resources and assets and class identities, subjective
identifications of one’s place within an economic and social system (Speer,
2015). Speer argues that class identities are strongly shaped by one’s family of
origin, which fits with Sennett and Cobb’s (1973) findings. In our clinical
experience, we have found that class identities can even be intergenerational.
For example, someone whose parents have achieved a middle-class social
positionality, but who came from a poor or working-class background, can pass
down class values and a sense of identity to their children who are born into
and grow up in a middle-class family and neighborhood. How strong, fixed or
fungible this identity is depends on the interaction of many factors in addition
to the intergenerational legacies, such as location of residence, the kind of
schools that one attends, and socioeconomic shifts in neighborhoods and
societies, as well as the interaction of social class with other aspects of a
person’s identity, such as race/ethnicity.
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There are other factors that further confound an understanding of social
class. Social class used to be understood within a societal or national context
but in today’s world it occurs in a global matrix. There is greater access to
information about life styles (including measures of happiness, well-being,
longevity, etc.) as well as media depicting how people representing certain
classes live from other countries. There are greater transnational flows of
people (e.g. immigration, seasonal workers), culture and of production (goods
and products made in a range of countries). Do workers from multiple
countries who collaborate to produce products such as cars and clothing share
a class allegiance or is this subsumed by national identifications? And of
course, there is now a proliferation of social media which creates communities
across space rather than in localities; how does this influence one’s inner sense
of class? None of this is neutral as leaders, demagogues, and political parties
pit one class against another, exploiting cheap labor, undermining labor
unions, and morally denigrating some while elevating others.
Morgan (2017) has developed a coding system for class that has seven
levels based on the US Census and the Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero
[EGP] (“Goldthorpe Class Scheme,” 2019) class schema, developed in the
1980’s and widely used by sociologists. Although this model acknowledges
class hierarchy, it is not “unidimensional” and allows for groupings that are not
necessarily hierarchical in relation to one another – they are different without
assigning absolute rankings. He proposes three levels of social class in a
white-collar group beginning with Class I- managers, administrators, officials
8

and high-level professionals such as doctors, engineers, lawyers and
professors. Interestingly, this does not make subtle distinctions between the
salaries of corporate CEOs and college professors as it combines economic
status with social and political aspects of social class. Class II lists “lowergrade” professionals – e.g. clergy, human resource managers, nurses, and
teachers. Social workers are listed in Class II. Members of both of these
classes enjoy regular salaries, benefits, and greater freedom and flexibility at
work. Class IIIA – higher grade service and non-manual workers – e.g.
bookkeepers, customer service representatives, real estate agents. Class IIIB
includes “lower grade” non-manual workers – cashiers, child-care workers,
hairdressers, home health aides.
Moving away from white color jobs, class IVA is “non-professional selfemployed workers with employees and IVB is for people self-employed without
other employees” (Morgan, 2017). Class V is composed of “higher-grade
technicians and repairers, public safety workers, performers, and supervisors
of manual workers,” which includes chefs, lab technicians, firefighters, police
officers, construction and sales supervisors. Class VI includes skilled manual
laborers, such as automobile mechanics, plumbers, electricians, painters and
repairers. Class VIIA consists of non-agricultural unskilled manual workers,
such as cooks, dishwashers, maintenance workers, packagers and
construction workers. Class VIIB encompasses all agricultural workers and
Morgan also has an unranked class for all members of the armed forces. Some
key factors within his class schema are years of completed education and
9

income from wages and salaries. Clearly, there are many differences within his
class groupings but he argues that research indicates that many people within
a class have similar political behaviors and attitudes (Morgan & Li, 2017). We
are sharing this model because of the greater range of class distinctions from
previous configurations of class, but some important factors that this schema
leaves out are those who are unemployed, underemployed, disabled, retired, or
frozen in unyielding lives and neighborhoods of poverty.
Despite the complexity of this model, there are still many other factors at
work which influence social class, such as levels of social mobility and
resources that come from contacts and social networks. More contemporary
scholars have raised the issue of social access as a key marker and predictor of
social class. For example, Szreter and Schuller (2000, page 1) identify social
capital as “social networks, the reciprocities that arise from them, and the
value of these for achieving mutual goals”. Lack of social capital can limit one’s
access to the tangible resources that result from such connections, for
instance, private investment in a business idea or model or social networks
that provide access to high income jobs.
Another factor is generational cohort. Generational cohorts may have
different expectations about what constitutes social classes, where they fit in
and what they aspire to. A person in their 70’s who is lumped into the same
class category as someone in their 20’s may have internalized what class meant
50 years ago, or perhaps their notions of the significance of class has evolved –
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but it is likely to differ somewhat from a younger person’s views about class.
Also, if there is a cataclysmic event, such as the Great Recession of 2008, a
person in their 70’s has little time to recoup their losses while a person in their
20’s may have time to gain further education and has more years of
employment ahead of them. Conversely, older people may have accrued more
resources that enable them to weather the storm, while an event like the Great
Recession can set wages back (and the ability to gain credit, buy homes, pay off
loans) so far that a younger person may never recover. Schwartz (2018) has
termed those born in the 1980s as the “lost generation for wealth
accumulation” because of the Great Recession. What is often problematic is
that even contemporary considerations of social class often omitted the
intersection of race, gender and other aspects of social identity, which we try to
respond to below, a discussion which intersectionality theory contributes to in
a substantial way.
Understanding Social Class from an Intersectional Lens
Contemporary narratives about social class.
Class has been racialized in the United States from the time of first
contact between Europeans and indigenous Americans and has continued
throughout the history of the U.S.: it is not possible to consider class
separately from the history and dynamics of racism in this country (Fenton,
1999). Class influenced which Europeans migrated to the U.S. and European
schemas of class were imposed in the Western hemispheres on indigenous
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societies, which included the racialized practices of genocide, enslavement and
ethnic cleansing (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2015; Miller & Garran, 2017). The enslavement
of African Americans and the subsequent privileges of whiteness given to poor,
white European-Americans became a central dynamic in America’s class
dynamics (Allen, 1994). This continued with the selective immigration policies
of the U.S. – admitting poor Europeans such as Italians, Irish, Poles and Jews
– while excluding Asian immigrants (e.g. Chinese and Japanese}, appropriating
parts of Mexico and dispossessing the Mexicans who lived in those lands, and
the ongoing project of white supremacy and racism that continues to be an
enduring factor in the US class calculus (Miller & Garran, 2017).
The term intersectionality refers to two major points of interaction: how
different forms of oppression interrelate and interconnect and how different
aspects of a person’s social identity are intermingled (Miller & Garran, 2017).
While intersectionality theory has and continues to develop, Crenshaw (2018)
recently explained it as “Intersectionality is a lens through which you can see
where power comes and collides, where it interlocks and intersects. It’s not
simply that there’s a race problem here, a gender problem here, and a class or
LBGTQ problem there. Many times that framework erases what happens to
people who are subject to all of these things.” The sociologist Charles Tilly
(1998) discussed how all forms of social oppression, or what he termed
“durable inequalities,” have certain things in common: exploitation by one
group of another group; hoarding of resources and opportunities by one group
at the exclusion of another; the adaptation and emulation of all of these
12

structural inequities and intergroup dynamics in a range of societal
representations – organizations, institutions, political dynamics, cultural
preferences, etc. As Bell (1997) has stated, social oppression is characterized
by how it is pervasive, restricting, hierarchical, and is internalized as well as
being an external reality. And power is an essential ingredient in social
imbalances (Yuval-Davis, 2006). This certainly is true of social class –
wealthier people have more assets and resources, social mobility, social
protections, social status, social and political power and more. But it is also
true of other aspects of social oppression and privilege – racism, sexism,
transphobia, heterosexism, ableism, etc. And it is not as if these are separate
and distinct forces; they interact and intersect in many ways.
The same is true of identity. None of us are strictly defined by one aspect
of our identities – we have class affiliations but also a sense of ourselves
racially, ethnically, our gender, sexual orientation, regional and national
attachments, degree of being able bodied, and much more. Social identity
refers to how we see ourselves in relation to other people as well as how others,
and society, read and construct who we are (Miller & Garran, 2017). There are
social aspects to identity – who we identify with and hang out with; affective –
how we feel about ourselves in relation to others; cognitive – how we think and
understand the world; ego-self – how we perceive, describe and think about
ourselves and others. Social class, race and ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation and other aspects of social identity impact individuals uniquely
because of the social contexts in which individuals find themselves – certain
13

situations may evoke a greater awareness of gender, others of social class,
while yet others one’s racial/ethnic identity.
While the awareness of some social identities may be stable (e.g. as a
social worker), others may be fluid and contextual. For example, a woman may
be very conscious of gender in a predominantly male workplace or a person
who is gender non-conforming may be very aware of this when surrounded by
cisgender colleagues. Identities also shift over time and are affected by larger
political and social factors, including the social construction of these identities
and how they shift over time. Social identities also respond to threats and are
often more visible to a person who is targeted, than identities that are mirrored
and are considered “normal” or “mainstream.” For example, immigrants of color
have been under fire from the Trump regime and are very aware of their
immigration status and race.
On the other hand, people with privileges – be it class, race, gender,
sexual orientation, etc. – are often less aware of their unearned privileges
(McIntosh, 1992; Miller & Garran, 2017). Class privileges include access to
employers, seeking health care without concern about cost, not worrying about
having enough to eat, being able to take regular vacations, and much more
(Ryan et al., 2018). Ironically, people with class privileges are often the least
supportive of social safety nets and attribute the struggles of people in lower
classes as being due to character and motivation, while viewing themselves as
having succeeded due to grit and perseverance. The lack of awareness of class
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privilege illustrates how “members of powerful groups do not realize that they
are privileged because they don’t have the social comparison information to
recognize the discrimination they do not experience, the poverty they don’t
experience, and the prejudice they do not experience” (Pratto & Stewart, 2012,
p. 31). Thus, people with higher socioeconomic status (SES) express less
sensitivity to others’ suffering, higher levels of entitlement and narcissism,
greater selfishness, and heightened propensity toward self-serving, unethical
behavior than lower SES groups (Ryan et al., 2018). Conversely, middle class
African Americans are much more likely to know someone who is poor than
middle class whites (Speer, 2015), creating greater familiarity and empathy for
those who are socioeconomically vulnerable.
There are at least five major areas, which interact with one another,
where social class intersects with other aspects of racism and white supremacy
(Miller & Garran, 2017):
1. Residential segregation and apartheid
2. Access to jobs and segmented labor markets
3. Racialized financial services
4. Lack of assets (particularly investment assets)
5. Being blamed for one’s lack of social mobility.
Many African Americans and increasing numbers of Hispanic Americans live
in highly-segregated neighborhoods, where there are fewer economic resources,
15

less access to public transportation, higher concentrations of poverty, higher
rates of crime and lack of safety, and less money spent on schools and
educational and recreational resources (Miller & Garran, 2017; Speer, 2015).
Some of this is due to explicit social policies – like “red lining” neighborhoods,
or allowing banks to discriminate against groups of applicants based on their
race, but there are also institutional impediments such as fewer educational
and employment opportunities and lack of transportation in segregated
neighborhoods. The combination of these factors creates a matrix of barriers,
which impede upward economic and class mobility (Miller & Garran, 2017).
African Americans have a great deal more difficulty receiving mortgages
and loans and when they do buy houses, because of segregation, the value of
homes does not rise as much as a home in a white neighborhood and often
property values go down (Miller & Garran, 2017; Shapiro, 2004). Thus, two of
the most important assets when it comes to upward mobility – home ownership
and education – are significantly less available to African Americans and many
Latinos/Latinas, which constrains upward class mobility. Because of the
interaction of racism and classism, a child born to African American parents in
the top economic quintile is just as likely to fall to the bottom quintile as
staying in place, while a white child is five times as likely to remain in the
upper class that they are born to (Edsall, 2018). There are fewer hedges and
circuit breakers against economic downturns and fewer resources and safety in
communities (Speer, 2015). Adding insult to injury, rather than considering
the structural impediments to economic parity because of institutional racism
16

and classism, people of color are often blamed for their lack of upward mobility
and become the target of scapegoating by many media outlets and politicians,
not only including but led by President Trump and the Republican party that
he now leads. By focusing on behavior, values and morals, there is little
impetus to change the structural factors that foster poverty, social exclusion
and inequality.
While there are intersections between race and class, there are also
divergences. Everything will not improve for people of color through classbased remedies. Ijeoma Oluo (2018), who identifies as an African American
woman, suggests that black people are poor for different reasons than white
people: not being offered job interviews because of their race and having blacksounding names, having their property values fall rather than rise when they
purchase homes, paying higher mortgage rate for those homes, having
incarcerated partners, parents and children who are unable to contribute to a
family income, not getting promoted as easily at work or doing the same work
for lower salaries than white people. These and many other issues are a
function of racism, so even when there are class-based strategies to achieve
greater equality, the social and economic consequences of racism remain
unaddressed.
When other identity categories get added to the mix we can see the
amplification of existing inequality. For instance, the work of Williams Institute
(2018) explores how gender, sexual orientation and race come together in the
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economic prospects of families. Households headed by two gay men (as defined
by the Census) have the highest mean income of any family group, including
that of heterosexual families. This is likely a result of the gender-income gap,
where men out earn women. As such, lesbian headed households fall at the
bottom of mean income of any two-parent family structure. Yet when race is
added to the picture the numbers change dramatically and households headed
by two black gay men fall to the bottom of mean incomes, likely a result of
institutional racism, combined with sexual orientation, which mitigates the
impact of gender.
On a broader level, class is closely related to colonialism. The wealth of
colonial powers (e.g. England, Holland, Germany, Italy and the U.S.) is greater
than that of colonial subjects (e.g. most countries in Africa and Latin America).
There are exceptions –such as the U.S., Canada and Australia (all countries
where white supremacy took hold)– where former colonies became wealthy and
even had colonies of their own – but the trend is fairly constant. This also
means that colonial powers had classes within their national group that
benefitted from the extraction of resources and exploitation of indigenous
people living in colonies, such as merchants, industrialists and politicians.
And when there were indigenous people living in countries like the U.S.,
Canada and Australia, they were killed, ethnically cleansed, enslaved and
displaced by colonial settlers, who became the dominant social class when
these colonies became independent countries (Dunbar Ortiz, 2015; Fanon,
2008; Finkelman, 2005, and Miller & Garran, 2017)). Not only do these
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inequities shape the internal class systems within countries and the
hierarchies of nationalized social classes between countries, they are also very
strong push forces for immigration and migration, and the racist, right-wing
populist movements to prevent these forces, such as Brexit in the UK and the
rise of Trumpism in the U. S.
As we write this article, not only has there been a rise in hate crimes
against people of color and Jews, but a singular focus by President Trump on
building a “wall” intended to keep immigrants and refugees from Latin
American from entering the US, even when they are trying to escape political
violence and domestic violence. In 2017, according to the FBI, hate crimes rose
by 17%, particularly targeting African Americans, Jews, LatinX, and Native
Americans. Large swathes of people (e.g. Haitians, El Salvadorians) have lost
their protected status and face deportation. President Trump’s travel ban,
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, suspends immigrant and non-immigrant
visas from five Muslim countries and North Korea and Venezuela (Gladstone &
Sugiyama, 2018). The combination of his anti-immigrant policies has had
significant implications for economic well-being for many immigrant families in
the US and abroad. Families, or individuals in those families, face deportation
or an inability to work in the U.S., which lowers their earning capacity along
with exposing women to a much higher risk of domestic violence (Kopan,
2018). It has also led to a climate of fear among immigrant communities in the
US, leading people to not claim or collect benefits for fear of deportation. Food
banks have reported lower numbers of women seeking help, leading to fears
19

not only about the economic consequences but also health and medical wellbeing of children and families (Ebbs, 2018).
As we have argued, trends in economic inequality in the United States
can be attributed to and explained by a variety of complicated social, political
and structural factors. The history of slavery, segregation, Jim Crow and mass
incarceration and institutionalized racism contribute greatly to both the trends
in economic inequality and to understanding the between and within group
differences of those who are at the top and bottom deciles of income in the
United States. For instance, Black families consistently have lower median
household incomes than any other race or ethnic group (as defined by the U.S.
Census, 2018), which is a clear result of the particularly virulent forms of antiBlack racism at the center of these histories. Industrialization and
technological trends, combined with the erosion of trade unions, has
contributed to stagnant incomes and limited occupational and social mobility,
which is further fueled by unequal access to educational and training
opportunities. These forces have limited the incomes and income mobility
across racial groups but are often most highlighted as an injury to the white
working class, particularly in rural communities. Finally, political forces
increasingly dominated by the economic elite, and the erosion of campaign
finance regulation further escalated inequality and are eroding the remaining
mechanisms to control. While income inequality continues to rise, it has done
so in concert with the elimination of the social safety net, intensifying the
dangers of living in poverty in the United States.
20

The Great Recession of 2008 was a major jolt of insecurity for all but
those in the wealthiest income brackets. The recession was caused by a
combination of predatory lending practices that led to soaring house prices
buoyed by unattainable mortgage structures and questionable practices across
the financial services industry. The response to the recession is tightly linked
to the increasing importance of campaign contributions, which has resulted in
lower tax rates for high income earners and less regulation for companies who
employ and are led by such earners (Frank, 2018), largely those companies in
the financial sector. Such corporations were bailed out by the federal
government, without a parallel bailout for the individuals who were the victims
of these predatory lending practices and lost their homes in the process.
The response by government to the recession contributed to a
suspicious, if not cynical view of government (Kuttner, 2016) that was exploited
by the very social class that benefitted from the bailouts. As inequality has
increased before and after the recession, the safety net diminished, growing
concern about fairness, there has been a greater tendency to scapegoat groups
such as immigrants (Edsall, 2018). This was fertile ground for a demagogic,
nationalist, authoritarian, populist candidate, Donald Trump, to win a closely
fought presidential election with the minority of the popular vote.
Social class, meaning making, and politics.
There are many competing narratives about the role of social class in the 2016
election. Most of these narratives fail to employ an intersectional lens, and
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thus problematically simplify the role of social class in both the election, and
the larger current political dynamics in the United States. To truly unpack the
factors that led to the rise of Trumpism, the ideology of Trumpism and its
frame of social class must be examined with other constructed social identities
such as race and gender. This analysis reveals how successfully fear of losing
privileged status can drive voter behavior. It is this fear that Trumpism
successfully harnesses to incite and excite its base.
The dominant post-election narrative was that white, working class
people were revolting against global and national elites. Often this narrative
includes references to geography, for instance that the plight of rural poor
whites was ignored by the Democratic party. J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy
(2016), underscores this narrative and introduces the idea that a new culture
of poverty has developed in rural white communities where people rely on
government assistance while at the same time harboring resentment about its
receipt. This narrative views rural white voters as victims of economic neglect
and industrialization by a government that favors urban cities and their
constituents. It argues that a culture of white elitism has emerged in the
highly educated class who attend out of touch, inaccessible, and social insular
institutions of higher education and then benefit from the social networks of
those institutions. Social inequality combined with resentment towards
“elites,” resulted in many more white people feeling angry and resentful.
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There are many problems with this dominant narrative. It centers a white
perspective, while at the same time obscuring the role of white voters across
the economic spectrum who supported Donald Trump. Doing so erases people
of color from the discussion entirely and highlights economic inequality within
white communities as the primary social issue warranting government
intervention. Poverty in communities of color is rendered invisible or irrelevant
to this political dynamic. Finally, this view fails to consider the role of gender,
and the ways in which it intersects with economic inequality, race, and voting
behavior. Poverty becomes a problem of white men in rural settings who
require more support from a government who has left them behind; while such
poor communities are suffering, so are many others.
This cannot be separated from anti-immigrant fears and fervor for
immigration restrictions, as well as bullhorns trumpeting and amplifying
racism (Morgan & Li, 2017). If class anxiety was the dominant driver fueling
support for Trump, why did so many working-class African Americans and
Latinos vote against him? In the age of Trump, class is now being used as a
meme to mostly mean white men and women who are against immigration and
are reluctant to see government benefits go to people of color. Is this populism
or a form of nativism and a reassertion of racialized power and privilege? As
Kuttner (2016) has argued, the contemporary dynamics of social class in the
U.S. reflect “the clash of deeply felt injuries,” where there are “dueling cultural
and economic wounds.”
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Implications for Social Work Practice
Given the current socio-political context, and its impact on oppressed
populations, we must consider how we are responding as clinical social work
educators, practitioners, and researchers. Social work education must grapple
with training clinical social workers who can struggle with the variety of ways
to understand social class but who also have a keen awareness of
intersectionality theory, particularly with regard to race, ethnicity and
immigration status. Practitioners need to understand how dominant macro
schemas and narratives about social class may be internalized by those
without access to social capital, while at the same time challenging such
narratives as half-truths and refocusing the analysis to externalizing the
causes of social class immobility. Finally, social work researchers and policy
makers must continue to examine the true causes of poverty and economic
inequality and offer concrete and practical policy solutions that will appeal to a
wide variety of voters.
Intersectionality and Social Work Education
While intersectionality is a buzzword in many academic settings,
teaching both the origin of and the theory itself is vitally important to social
work. Intersectionality must be understood not just as an intersection of
identities, but as a lens through which to view history, experiences, meanings,
and practice. Using this lens takes practice and coaching that can be provided
during a student’s education. For instance, if a class is considering a case
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about an adoptee of color it is important not only to name the identities of each
family member but to use an intersectional lens to consider how these
identities impact each family and their current circumstances. For instance,
one could open a discussion of cross-cultural adoption practices and the
history of forced acculturation to white, middle and upper class ways of being
and how these histories may or may not be understood or enacted in this
family system. Too often we stop at naming multiple identities rather than
fully understanding what an intersectional lens can reveal.
Social Work Practice
The current political climate, and the economic realities in the United
States mean that social workers are seeing clients with increasingly acute
needs in decreasingly resourced settings. The depth and breadth of rampant
rhetoric aimed at vilifying people of color, immigrants, individuals who identify
as transgender and women makes day to day functioning dangerous for the
clients with whom we interact. Clinicians have developed a variety of
interventions, such as the Liberation Health Triangle (Martinez & FleckHenderson, 2014) that can help clients analyze the impact of oppression on
their lives or narrative approaches that help externalize social class myths.
These types of interventions should be learned, taught, and practiced, helping
clients and practitioners recognize and respond to structural inequality. This
recognition of structural inequality creates an opportunity for productive social
policy change geared towards eliminating such inequalities while also affording
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the opportunity for the redirection of anger and fear towards the other from
nationalist and co-opted populist messaging.
Research and Macro Practice
Researchers and macro practitioners must continue to document and
expose the real causes of social inequality and offer practical solutions
grounded in research and social justice, while centralizing the experiences of
oppressed populations and the role that systematic oppression has in creating
such equalities. This task has, and will continue to be, increasingly difficult as
the federal government is the primary funding entity for much of our work.
Often, these funding mechanisms guide our work towards the questions that
suit the investments of those in power. We must resist these efforts.
Institutions outside of the government (like educational and philanthropic
organizations) that have the possibility to fund social work research should
consider doing so and re-imagine and re-vitalize grants to social work
researchers as a way to provide an alternative to reliance on government
funding.
Macro practitioners must use this political moment to find and assert a
place at the table. The electorate is often thought of through an identity
politics lens that centralizes a single aspect of a voter’s experience. By
bringing an intersectional lens to such analysis, we may offer insights and
approaches not seen by other political operatives. We must resist narratives
that reduce complexity. For instance, poverty cannot and should not be
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divorced from racism in the public discourse. Considering poverty with such a
lens dramatically changes the policy initiatives poverty reduction requires.
This is the kind of re-imagining that social work can and should tackle.
Perhaps most importantly, across education, practice and research, we
must contest the division of social class conversations from those about race,
ethnicity and immigration as they obscure the realities of structural racism in
the United States, and its overwhelming contribution to current social
inequalities.
Conclusion
We have described how class is not only about economic and social
status but also about identity. The current political regime understands
this and class has become a racialized weapon of right-wing nativism,
pitting people who identify as white working class not only against socalled “elites” but people of color, immigrants, women and queer
populations.
Social workers can respond to this in a number of ways. One is to
ensure an intersectional analysis when discussing and teaching about
social class. The current public narratives about class harken back to a
mythic, white US, when social scientists and scholars also discussed class
in a one-dimensional fashion. We hope that social workers will
complicate and contribute to public discourses by using an intersectional
class analysis.
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Social workers can also help our clients to explore how oppression
in their lives is internalized and how they can respond to these ‘hidden
injuries’ in ways that are liberating rather than supporting demagogues
who act against their class interests. The profession can also contribute
to research about the structural factors that foster greater economic and
social inequality, which is necessary to refute the appropriation of class
grievances and resentment into an anti-immigration sense of white
identity and white supremacy. The stakes are very high for the
profession as they are for our nation.

References

28

Allen, T. (1994). The invention of the white race. NY: Verso.
Bell, L.A. (1997). Theoretical foundations for social justice education. In
M.Adams, L.A. Bell, & P. Griffen (eds.). Teaching for diversity and social
justice. NY: Routledge.
Benn, M. (2001, Feb. 2). Inner city scholar. The Guardian, accessed online on
9/19/18 at
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/feb/03/books.guardianrevi
ew4
Crenshaw, K. (2017, June 8). Kimberle Crenshaw on intersectionality, more
than two decades later. Columbia Law School. Accessed at
https://www.law.columbia.edu/pt-br/news/2017/06/kimberlecrenshaw-intersectionality.
Dunbar-Ortiz, R. (2015). An indigenous people’s history of the United States.
Boston: Beacon Press.
Edsall, T.B. (2018, September 20). Can the Democrats rise above? The New
York Times, accessed at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/democrats-inequalitypolicy-midterms.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage
Encyclopedia of Sociology (1974). Dushkin Publishing Group, Guilford, Ct.
Fanon, F. (2008). Concerning violence (p. 32ff). London: Penguin.
Fenton, S. (1999). Ethnicity, racism, class and culture. NY: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Finkelman, P. (2005). Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown.
29

Gladstone, R, & Sugiyama, S. (2018, July 1). Trump’s travel ban: how it
works and who is affected. The New York Times, accessed at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-bantrump-how-it-works.html.
"Goldthorpe class scheme." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Retrieved June 09,
2019 from Encyclopedia.com: https://www.encyclopedia.com/socialsciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-pressreleases/goldthorpe-class-scheme
Kopan, T. (2018, July 12). Trump administration to turn away far more
asylum seekers at the border under new guidance. CNN, accessed at
https://www.ktbs.com/news/national/trump-administration-to-turnaway-far-more-asylum-seekers-at/article_9ff4d445-f377-5cb1-8fca1f017f6d1582.html.
Kuttner, R. (2016, Oct. 3). Hidden injuries of class, race and culture: The
decline of the white working class and the rise of the Tea Party and
Donald Trump. The American Prospect, Accessed on 9/19/18 at
http://prospect.org/article/hidden-injuries-0
LGBT Demographic Data Interactive (January 2019) Los Angeles, CA: The
Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law.
McIntosh, P. (1992). White privilege and male privilege: A personal account of
coming to see correspondences through work in women’s studies. In M.
Anderson and P.H. Collins (Eds.). Race, class and gender: An anthology.
(pp. 70-81). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
30

Martinez, D. B., & Fleck-Henderson, A. (Eds.). (2014). Social justice in clinical
practice: A liberation health framework for social work. Routledge.
Miller, J., & Garran, A.M. (2017). Racism in the United States: Implications for
the helping professions (2nd ed.). NY: Springer Publishing Co.
Morgan, Stephen L. 2017. “A Coding of Social Class for the General Social
Survey.” GSS Methodological Report No. 125, National Opinion Research
Center, Chicago, Illinois. DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/9NKRW
Morgan, S.L., & Li J. (2017). The white working class and voter turnout in US
Presidential elections, 2004-2016. Sociological Science, 4, 656-685
Pratto, F., & Stewart, A. L. (2012). Group dominance and the half‐blindness of
privilege. Journal of Social Issues, 68(1), 28-45.
Oluo, I. (2018). So you want to talk about race. NY: Seal Press.
Ryan, D.A., Singh, M.R., Hentschke, E.A., Bullock, H.E. (18). “Minding the
Gap”: Social Psychological Insights for Strengthening Interclass Relations
and Advancing Economic Justice. Translational Issues in Psychological
Science, 4(2), 187-197.
Sennett, R., & Cobb, J. (1973). The hidden injuries of class. New York:
Vintage Books.
Schwartz, N. (2018, September 12). The recover threw the middle class dream
under the Benz. The New York Times, accessed at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-classfinancial-crisis.html.

31

Shapiro, T. M. (2004). The hidden cost of being African American: How wealth
perpetuates inequality. Oxford University Press, USA.
Singha, C. (2017). Measurement issues of the social class in social psychology
of education: Is it a category mistake? Polish Psychological Bulletin, 48(4)
481–488 DOI - 10.1515/ppb-2017-0055
Speer, I. (2015). Race, wealth and class identification in 21st century America.
The Sociological Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/tsq.12136.
Szreter, S & Schuller, T. (2000). Social capital, the economy, and education in
historical perspective. Social capital: Critical perspectives. Social Capital:
Critical Perspectives: Critical Perspectives. 56-77.
Tilley, C. (1998). Durable inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Vance, J. D., & Vance, J. D. (2016). Hillbilly elegy (p. 238). New York, NY:
HarperCollins.
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and feminist politics. European journal
of women's studies, 13(3), 193-209.

32

